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Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
The application of agency principles in the context of federal
securities law violations has long been a cause of dissension among the
various circuit courts of the United States.' The conflict has arisen
over whether section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which provides that controlling persons may be liable for the securities violations of others, 2 supplants the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior. 3 Of the circuit courts which have considered

I Cases which have considered this problem include: Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,
629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 101 S. Ct. 566 (1981) (brokerage house responsible for
employee's fraudulent misrepresentation under doctrine of respondeat superior); Christoffel v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978) (doctrine of respondeat superior replaced as
theory of liability by section 20(a)); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) (adoption of section 20(a) makes application of respondeat
superior inappropriate): Sherman v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975) (respondeat
superior not applicable as theory of liability against corporation): Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521
F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 102.5 (1975) (controlling corporation's liability arose
from section 20(a) rather than respondeat superior); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036
(7th Cir. 1974) (broker liable for action of representative under general agency principles);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (application of agency principles not
restricted by section 20(a)); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) (brokerage house partners liable under agency principles for tortious
misrepresentation of lower management); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (broker-dealer sanctioned for wilful violations of agents
under doctrine of respondeat superior); M)'zel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (dicta implies that agency principles apply to securities violations);
Kamen & Co. v. Paul M. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968) (section 20(a) supplants respondeat superior as theory of liability).
Section 20(a) provides that:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or course of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1979).
Respondeat superior is defined as:
Let the master answer. This maxim meant that a master is liable in certain cases
for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent. Burger
Chef Systems, Inc. v. Govio, C.A. Mo., 407 F.2d 921, 925. Under this doctrine
master is responsible for want of care in servant's part toward those to whom master
owes dut' to use care, provided failure of servant to use such care secured in the
course of his employment. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co.,
Tex. Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 829, 832. Doctrine applies only when relation of master
and servant existed between defendant and wrongdoer at time of injury sued for, in
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this problem, the majority have concluded that section 20(a) and
respondeat superior are not mutually exclusive. 4 The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, however, have consistently held to the contrary. 5 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,6 a
recent Third Circuit decision, will be examined in this Note. Sharp is
significant in that it indicates a willingness on the part of the court to
apply the doctrine of respondeat superior in a limited number of
cases, despite the general rule in the Third Circuit that section 20(a) is

to be used exclusively.
Westland Minerals Corporation (WMC) served as the promoter
of the "Ohio Program," a business venture, from July 1971 until July
1972. The Ohio Program consisted of numerous limited partnerships
which were formed for the purpose of raising capital to drill for oil
and gas.7 Each limited partnership was to expend a total of

respect to very transaction from which it arose. Hence, doctrine is inapplicable
where injury occurs while servant is acting outside legitimate scope of authority.
Rogers v. Town of Black Mountain, 224 N.C. 119, 29 S.E.2d 203, 205. But if
deviation be only slight or incidental, employer may still be liable. Klotsit v. P.F.
Collier & Son Corporation, 349 Mo. 40, 159 S.W.2d 589, 593, 595; Adams v.South
Carolina Power Co., 200 S.C. 438, 21 S.E.2d 17, 19, 20.
BLACK's LAw DicroNARY

1179 (5th ed. 1979). A conflict also exists with respect to section 15 of

the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1979). This section is similar to section 20(a) in that it
imposes vicarious liability on controlling persons while also providing a defense for those who
"had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts bv reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." Id.
I E.g., Marbury Management v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 101 S.
Ct. 566 (1981); SEC v. Geon. Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976): SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Fev v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th
Cir. 1974); Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926
(1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971): Armstrong, Jones & Co. v.
SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Myzel v. Fields. 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo See.
Clearance Corp., [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,537 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
5 E.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978): Zwieg v. Hearst
Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1976); Thomas v. Duralite
Co., 524 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1975); Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 482 F.2d 247. 256 (8th
Cir. 1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul M. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967). cert. denied,
393 U.S. 801 (1968).
8 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981). Publication of the court of appeals decision brings the total
number of published decisions in this matter to five. The four district court opinions are: Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 491 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (court rendered judgment after
consideration of jury's answers to interrogatories); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (court discussed interrogatories and various theories of damages employed at
second trial on individual issues); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (court considered several motions at conclusion of first trial on class issuer); Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 70 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court granted plaintiffs' class certification).
7 649 F.2d at 178.
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$140,000. Of this sum, $65,000 was to be paid by investors in the
limited partnership, and the balance was to be supplied by banks and

other lending institutions.8 In April of 1971, WMC and Economic
Concepts, Inc. (ECI), the selling agent for the limited partnerships,
employed the services of Coopers & Lybrand, an accounting firm.,
Specifically, WMC and ECI requested that an opinion letter be
drafted for a potential investor concerning the tax consequences of
investment in the limited partnerships.'"
Coopers & Lybrand drafted the letter which was sent to the

president of WMC on July 22, 1971."

The letter stated that an

investment of $65,000 in the limited partnership would result in
allowable tax deductions of $128,000.12 This letter was written by a
tax supervisor and signed by a partner in the firm. In October of 1971,
the tax supervisor informed a Coopers & Lybrand partner that the
letter was being shown to several other potential investors as part of a
general sales program.' 3 Because of the increased use of the July 22,
1971 letter, Coopers & Lybrand issued a second, more complete,

opinion letter on October 11, 1971.'1 The second letter, which was
drafted by the same tax supervisor, likewise maintained that an investor would be able to claim a $128,000 tax deduction for an investment
of $65,000.'1
A major problem arose with respect to the October 11, 1971
letter because it contained material misrepresentations and omis-

sions.'

Securing large amounts of money through loans was essential

id.
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
''
Id. This initial letter was for the use of Muhammed Ali, a potential investor, who was
interested in the WNMC venture as a method of reducing the taxation of a prizefight purse.
II 649 F.2d at 178.
'I Id. Professor Bernard Wolfman, a federal income taxation specialist, testified at the jury
trial as to the principles behind this tax shelter. The trial court summarized Professor Wolfman's
testimonv:
[A] taxpayer who in 1971 contributed $2.5,000 to a partnership involved in a bona
fide oil drilling venture, which then obtained for each $25,000 contribution an
additional 25,000 bona fide bank loan that was fully secured by partnership
property (the as yet undrilled wells) and then expended all of that $50,000 for
drilling, could under the law applicable in 1971 deduct the full $50,000 from his
taxable income.
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part.
649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
'1 649 F.2d at 178.
" Id.
'"The third opinion issued by the district court contains an appendix in which the letters of
July 22, 1971 and October 11, 1971 are repeated verbatim. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83
F.R.D. 343, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aJJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
",Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1978), af'd in part, rev'd
in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981). Specifically, the trial in this matter was concerned with the
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to the success of the plan. The letter failed to mention, however, that
the non-recourse loans which lending institutions would presumably
make to WMC would have to be secured by collateral.17 Ideally, this
collateral would be the very oil wells which would be purchased.' 8 An
inherent flaw in this plan, however, was that banks are not willing to
advance money upon such collateral because the value of the undrilled wells is unknown.' 9 Coopers & Lybrand, therefore, suggested
that WMC borrow money from a bank and use the money to purchase
savings certificates from the same bank.20 The bank would then hold
the certificates as collateral, resulting in a "paper transaction"
whereby WMC would have the loans necessary for the tax shelter on
paper, but would never actually receive any money. 2'

WMC fol-

lowed the suggestion of Coopers & Lybrand and conducted the transactions through a bank in the Bahamas which it had acquired in
September of 1971.22
When WMC was indicted for securities fraud the entire scheme
began to unravel. 3 Many of the oil wells had never been drilled,24
October 11, 1971 letter because it was used in WMC's general sales program. The bulk of
testimony concerning the misrepresentations and omissions wi's provided by Professor Bernard
Wolfman. See id. and note 12 supra.
17 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afJ'd in part. rer'd
in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
Is Id.
9 Id. Several other problems with the October 11 letter vis-a-vis material misrepresentations
and omissions also became apparent at trial:
In particular, evidence suggested that [the tax supervisor] as of October lb (a)
had recommended to WMC that it take the bank loans through mere bookkeeping
transactions 'without having to make a bank loan in the normal sense that we think
of,' (b) knew that WMC had acquired a bank, International Bank & Trust of the
Bahamas (IBI), (c) knew that the IBI was insolvent, or at least unable to make the
loans necessary to fund the oil drilling venture contemplated by the WMC limited
partnership agreements, and (d) knew that the actual drilling costs for each limited
partnership would be less than $140,000.
Id. at 883-84. According to Professor Wolfman, the writer of the October 11, 1971 letter made
several misstatements in the letter which resulted in misrepresentations as to the tax consequences of the venture. Id.
Professor Wolfman also noted "that it was improper for an employee of an accounting firm
who was employed by ECI to write a tax opinion letter and that the failure to disclose his [the
tax supervisor's] relationship with the selling agent would be a material omission which would
appear to have been intentional or reckless." Id. at 884.
20 649 F.2d at 179.
21 Id. By way of a footnote, the court mentioned that this "paper transaction" changed the
venture from a tax shelter to a " 'Ponzi scheme' in which two investors were necessary to fulfill
the obligations owed to one." Id. at 179 n.2.
22 Id. at 179.
- id.
24 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part. rev'd
in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
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many were dry, 25 and much of the money 28 supplied by the investors
was diverted for the use of WMC. 27 Shortly after the indictment, the
Internal Revenue Service began denying deductions taken by the
program's investors.28 On May 8, 1975, Stanley Sharp filed suit in

federal district court against Coopers & Lybrand on behalf of himself
and two hundred and ten other WMC investors. 2 Sharp alleged
violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,30 as
well as violations of rule 10b-5. 3 1 From February 27 to March 10,
1978, a jury trial was held as to the issues which were common to the

class. 32 The jury found that the October 11, 1971 opinion letter
contained material misrepresentations and omissions. 33 It also determined that the tax supervisor had acted recklessly and intentionally. 34 The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Coopers &
Lybrand was responsible for the actions of the tax supervisor under
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, as well as liable

23 649 F.2d at 179.
" Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afj'd in part, rev'd
in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
27 649 F.2d at 179.
28 Id.

29 Id. Class certification was granted by the trial judge on February 19, 1976. See Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 70 F.R.D. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 175
(3d Cir. 1981).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the issue of any
memo or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
31 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1981). This rule provides that:
It shall be unlawful for one person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
32 649 F.2d at 179.
Id. This finding was in response to special interrogatories posed by the trial court. Id.
I1
34

Id.
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under section 20(a). 35 Coopers & Lybrand appealed the decision of

the trial court.36 One of the arguments advanced on appeal was that
the trial judge erred when he held Coopers & Lybrand secondarily
liable. 37 Judge Aldisert, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, affirmed the trial court decision because he agreed that respondeat superior should apply in cases which involve high fiduciary
38
duties.

Although the Sharp court analyzed several issues, 39 only two are
significant for the purpose of this Note: the applicability of respondeat

superior, and the scienter requirement in 10b-5 actions. In addressing
the issue of respondeat superior,the Sharp court first examined Rochez
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades (Rochez II),40 a prior Third Circuit case. In
Rochez II, a corporate president purchased a large block of shares
from the corporate vice-president. 4' The president failed to disclose
to the vice-president that certain third parties were interested in
acquiring the corporation. 42 When the president sold his shares to a

's

Id.The trial court also found as a matter of law that Coopers & Lvbrand was liable for the
tax supervisor's conduct under section 20(a) of the Securities Exhange Act of 1934. Id.
From May 12 to May 19, 1980, a second jury trial was held concerning the issue of
damages. The findings and decisions of this particular trial are of no real import to this Note.
The trial court's opinion from this second trial is reported in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand. 491
F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
30 649 F.2d at 179.
31 Id. at 179-80. On appeal, Coopers & Lybrand raised three other arguments in addition to

challenging the applicability of respondeat superior. They were: 1) the district court judge made
an error when lie neglected to properly instruct the jury with regard to section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 2) an error occurred during the second trial when a presumption was created that the class representative relied on the October 11 letter and the misrepresentations and omissions therein; 3) the measure of damages established by the district court wa's
wrong. Id. at 180. In addition, the court of appeals considered a host of minor issues raised b%
Coopers & Lybrand. Id. at 191-94.
Judge Aldisert was joined in his opinion by the other two members of the panel. Chief
Judge Markey, who sat by designation, and Circuit Judge Higginbotham.
'9 Judge Aldisert also considered the other issues raised by Coopers & Lybrand in its appeal.
See note 37 supra. Briefly, the court of appeals found error in the trial court's failure to instruct
the jury with regard to Coopers & Lybrand's liability under section 20(a). In light of its entire
holding, however, the appellate court did not find a retrial of the liability issue to be necessary.
649 F.2d at 185. After a rather lengthy analysis, the court held that the trial judge had not erred
in his treatment of the reliance issue. Id. at 189. The court did, however, take exception to the
trial court's determination of the proper measure of damages and, accordingly, remanded the
damages issue for retrial with instructions. Id. at 191.
40 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975). There are two Third Circuit cases involving the RocheBros., Inc. v. Rhoades litigation. In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades (Rochez 1), 491 F.2d 402 (3d
Cir. 1974), the court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment as to the application of
agency principles to securities violations and remanded with instructions.
41 527 F.2d at 883.
4I Id. The corporation's president had retained a third party to seek buyers for the entire
corporation. Although this third party did not find the ultimate purchaser of the corporation, lie
did provide the president with several leads. See Rochez I, 491 F.2d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 1974).
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third party at a great profit, 43 the vice-president filed suit against both

the president and the corporation. 44 The court of appeals held that
although the district court was correct in finding the president liable
under rule lOb-5, 45 the corporation could not be held secondarily
liable under the theory of respondeat superior.4 6 The Rochez H court
reasoned that if respondeat superior were applied, the good faith
defense provided in section 20(a) would be vitiated and the controlling person held strictly liable, thus expanding liability beyond the
bounds envisioned by Congress. 47 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that respondeat superior should not be applied because the "controlling persons" provision of section 20(a) requires "culpable participa-

tion."'4 8 In dictum, however, the court acknowledged that respondeat superior should apply in "the type of relationship that prevails in
the broker-dealer cases where a stringent duty to supervise employees
does exist." 49 The Sharp court seized upon this dictum and concluded
that the instant case fit within the Rochez HI exception. 50
The Sharp court maintained that a "stringent duty to supervise

its employees"' arose in the instant case because Coopers & Lybrand
was in a "position in which the investing public would place their
trust and confidence in it."' 52 Judge Aldisert reasoned that Coopers &
Lybrand had placed itself in such a position by issuing a letter upon
which it knew the investing public would rely. 53 In short, the court
could not distinguish "the responsibility of the accounting firm here
' 4
from the broker-dealer discussed in Rochez I." 1

41 527 F.2d at 883. The corporate president bought the vice-president's stock for $598,000.
Eleven months later, he and two others to whom he had sold stock sold the entire corporation for
$4.250,000, in addition to other consideration. Rochez 1, 491 F.2d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 1974).
11 527 F.2d at 883.
4% Id.
'"
Id.
47 Id.

1 Id. at 886.
" Id. at 885.
"' 649 F.2d at 181. The court also relied upon Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 566 (1980), for the proposition that respondeat
superior should apply in the limited context of broker-dealers. Reliance upon Marbury is
misplaced, however. The Marbury court did not limit its holding to the facts of that case which
involved a broker-dealer relationship. On the contrary, the court believed that Congress intended to broaden available remedies when it enacted section 20(a), and that respondeat
superior should apply generally. Id. at 716.
649 F.2d at 184 (quoting Rochez II, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Iid. at 183.
IId. at 184-85.
Id. at 184.
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Judge Aldisert could very well have ended his analysis at this
point. Instead, he chose to examine case law in other jurisdictions. He
noted that other courts have applied respondeat superior in cases
5 and that courts
involving high level employees 55 or brokerage firms,
57
have emphasized the public trust of these firms.
Furthermore, the court put forth a policy argument in support of
its position. The court reasoned that if respondeat superior were not
applicable in such a case, a "Chinese wall" might be erected between
the partners in an accounting firm and its employees. 5 8 There would
be a strong incentive for partners not to use their expertise and to let
lower level employees deal in matters involving the public, since by
doing this the firm would never be held liable.59 The court noted,
however, that because of the vital role which accounting firms play in
our society, its holding must, of necessity, be of limited scope.60 Were
it otherwise, the "hazards of rendering expert advice" might become
too great. 6'
Finally, the court dealt summarily with the issue of whether the
scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 actions precludes a finding of liability on the part of Coopers & Lybrand. The court recognized that the
standard of scienter to be applied in a rule 10b-5 case is that of
recklessness. 6 Coopers & Lybrand argued that it could not be held
liable since recklessness was not shown on its part. 13 The court held
- Id. at 182. E.g., Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978) (respondeat superior
applied to hold newly incorporated partnership liable for activities of two of four former
partners), Krebs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974) (corporation responsible for
president's fraud), Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied. 396
U.S. 1003 (1970) (officers and directors of bank made up significant portion of class of defendants).
The court noted that the activities of high level officers and directors binds a corporation
primarily and, therefore, makes the application of respondeat superior unnecessary. 649 F.2d at
184 n.8.
50649 F.2d at 182. E.g., Henrickson v. Henrickson, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1981); Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd,
536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Walston &
Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
37 649 F.2d at 182. See Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
m 649 F.2d at 184. For a full discussion of the "Chinese Wall" and its role in the securities
field, see Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problem of Securities
Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 459 (1975).
so649 F.2d at 184.
6o Id.

Id.
42 In the context of rule IOb-5, "scienter" is defined as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1975).
0 649 F.2d at 193. The Sharp court cited the following definition of "reckless conduct": "[A]
highly unreasonable statement or mission involving not merely negligence or inexcusable
81
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that recklessness need not be shown on the part of Coopers & Lybrand
because the accounting firm "owed a duty of careful supervision to the

investors, enforceable by the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior. "6 4 So long as the employee acted recklessly, Coopers &
Lybrand could be held liable. 5
There are various ways in which a person can be held liable for
the acts of another under the common law. Vicarious liability is
generally based upon an existing relationship between the tortfeasor
and the person sought to be held liableA86 For example, where an

employer-employee relationship exists, an employer who controls the
actions of his employee
can be found liable under the doctrine of
67
"respondeat superior."

Where a principal-agent relationship exists,
a principal can be held liable for the acts of his agent under the
doctrines of actual or apparent authority. 6 8 "[T]he modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of
a risk."6 9 In the corporate context, the concept of vicarious liability

has been used by plaintiffs to reach "a deeper pocket."-70 Attempts to
impose liability based upon the apparent authority of an agent, however, have generally proved unsuccessful because plaintiffs who buy
shares over the exchanges usually cannot prove reliance. 7' Nonethe-

negligence, but an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care, presenting a danger of
misleading buyers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must
have known it." Id. (quoting McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1979) (appendix)).
" Id. at 194.
Id.

W. Paoss~n. infra note 68, at § 69.
7 Id. at 458. See note 3 supra.
" These included the doctrine of apparent authority and actual authority, both implied and
express. Actual authority is defined as "the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the
principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him."
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AENcy § 7 (1957). For a brief discussion of implied and express
authority, see id., comment c. Apparent authority is defined as "the power to affect the legal
relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other,
arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." Id. § 8.
See generally W. PnossEn, HANDBOOK OF THlE LAW OF Toirrs §§ 69-70, at 458-67 (4th ed. 1971).
60W. PNossER, supra note 68, § 69, at 459.
70 See generally Note, The Burden of Control-DerivativeLiability Under Section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019, 1020 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
N. Y. U. Note]; Note, The "ControllingPersons"Liability of Broker-Dealersfor Their Employee's
Federal Securities Violations, [1974] DuKE L.J. 824 [hereinafter cited as Duke Note].
71N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1030. E.g., Sennott Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th
Cir. 1973) (brokerage house not liable absent showing that plaintiff relied upon former employee's apparent authority). In the majority of cases, apparent authority will not be available as
a theory of liability because of the reliance requirement. In faceless transactions occurring over
the stock exchanges, it is impossible to prove that one relied upon an agent's apparent authority.
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1030.
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less, the doctrine of respondeat superior has often been used to impose
strict liability on a corporation for the acts of its employees even
though the doctrine traditionally has not been applied where an
employee acts for purely personal motives. 2 Where an employee acts
outside the scope of his employment, a court may apply the doctrine if

it finds that "the master [is] under such a duty to the plaintiff that
responsibility for the servant's acts may not be delegated to him. " 73

Upon enactment of section 20(a), it was thought by some that
these common law principles had been preempted. 74

Section 20(a)

provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
75
constituting the violation or cause of action.
Obviously this section provides for several defenses which would not
be available at common law. A defendant may argue that he is not a
controlling person, or that he has acted in good faith and did not
induce the violation. With respect to the controlling person requirement, there has been much confusion in the courts because Congress
7 N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1030.
W. PnossER, supra note 68, § 70, at 465. There are several situations in which an employer
W
fiiay be held liable despite the fact that the employee was not acting within the scope of his
employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct of the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) or AGENCY § 219 (1957). Traditionally, an employer could be held liable
for reckless conduct. As discussed in text at notes 123-26 infra, this is in harmony with the
scienter requirement. It is argued below that no person should be held secondarily liable for
merely negligent conduct. Therefore, whenever conduct is "'reckless," it is possible for a person to
be found liable under either section 20(a), or respondeat superior, regardless of whether the
employee acted outside the scope of his employment.
" E.g., Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability and Respondeat Superior:
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W. L. REV. 152, 154, 171-73 (1979); Duke
Note, supra note 70, at 827, 837-38. Contra, Note, Vicarious Liability for Securities Law
Violations: Respondeat Superiorand the ControllingPersons Sections, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv.
713, 715, 723 (1974) [hereinafter cited as William & Alary Note]; N. Y. U. Note, supra note 70, at
1021, 1034-41.
75 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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never defined the term. 76 Securities Exchange Act rule 12b-2(f),
however, states that control means "the possession, directly or indi-

rectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."

been applied to section 20(a)

cases.78

77

This definition has

Some courts have held that

there is a presumption that a director or officer of the corporation is in
control. 79 The majority of courts, however, have held that actual
control must be present.8 0 The majority view seems to be consistent

with the legislative history to section 20(a). 8'

With respect to the

good faith defense, courts have struggled to determine whether a

TO
527 F.2d

at 890 n.19.
It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the term -control". It would be
difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which
control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock ownership,
lease, control; and agency. It is well known that actual control sometimes may be
exerted through ownership of much less than a majority of the stock of a corporation
either by ownership of such stock alone or through such ownership in combination
with other factors,
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1981).
7, 1 A. BnoMnEnc, SECURITIES LAW § 4.7(634), at 88.105 (1975). E.g., Rochez II,527 F.2d at
890; Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 538 (D. Md.
1978); Harriman v. E. 1. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 104-05 & n.2 (D. Del.
1974). But see A. JAcoBs, TnE IMPAcr OF RULE lOb-5 § 40.04, at 2-131 n.7 (1980) (most cases
have not relied upon rule 12b-2(o). See generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 764-83
(1961).
11 E.g., Moerman v.Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970). See N.Y.U. Note, supra note 65, at 1022: Myzel v.Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (actual control not necessary-only need
influence).
" E.g., Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
926 (1973); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,033 (E.D.
Wis. 1977); Mader v. Armel, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,027
(S.D. Ohio 1971), aJffd, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972). See
generally Sommer, "Who " 'InControl'?-S.E.C.," 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 562-83 (1966).
To determine "control" one commentator has suggested that the following factors are
relevant:
(a) proposition of voting rights (through stock ownership, trust, proxy or otherwise)
relative to remaining voting rights and relative to percentages required (by statute,
charter, by law, agreement or otherwise) for pertinent acts;
(b) director, officer, or other positions of power within the company;
(e)business or financial leverage outside the company, e.g., by customer or supplier
relationship or by loan agreement;
(d) personality factors, and other relationships by family or through business;
(e) history of past cooperation or opposition;
(f) with respect to the litigated transaction, who originated the idea, who negotiated
it,who reviewed it, who questioned or objected to it, who approved it, and related
circumstances.
I A. BRoMBERC, supra note 78, § 4.7 (634), at 88.107-08.
", Examination of the legislative intent behind section 20(a) confirms this.
In this section ... when reference is made to "'control" it is intended to include
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failure to supervise is sufficient grounds upon which to impose liability.8 2 As for the requirement of non-inducement, the issue has been
whether an affirmative act is required. 83 At least one commentator
believes that mere negligence is not sufficient to show lack of good
faith, and that an affirmative act is necessary to show inducement.84
Because of the defenses which Congress made available in section
20(a), several courts have concluded that common law principles are
generally no longer applicable.8 5 The majority of courts, however,
has held that section 20(a) does not preclude application of these
principles. 8 For example, in Holloway v. Howerdd,8 7 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that section 20(a) was not intended
to preempt the operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior in a
case involving unlawful activity on the part of a brokerage firm
employee. 8 The court reasoned that the controlling person provision
in section 20(a) was intended to expand, rather than restrict, liability.8 9 Similarly, in Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 10 the Court of
actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceble control. (See Handy
& Harmon v. Burnet, (1931) 284 U.S. 136). It was thought undesirable to attempt to
define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or anticipate the
many ways in which actual control may be exerted.
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). As one commentator noted, this language
can be interpreted to include "control-by-status" as well as actual control. N.Y. U. Note, supra
note 70, at 1923. Reference is made to Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931).
however, a case in which the court "look[ed] for evidence of actual control." Id. at 1024.
Furthermore, it was stated in a debate prior to adoption of section 20(a) that "['t]he
man
charged with control is only responsible to the extent he did control the action complained of.
and his actual control must be established." 78 Cong. Rec. 8095 (1934) (statement of Mr. Lea).
82 E.g.,Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 414 U.S.
926 (1973) (good faith requires knowledge of violation); SEC v. First Securities Co.. 463 F.2d
981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (failure to supervise is lack of good faith): Rolf
v. Blyth Eastman Dillen & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'J'd in part and
remanded, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (failure to supervise is lack
of good faith).
11 Some courts have held that a person can be held liable for failing to properly supervise an
employee. E.g., SEC v. First See. Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 880 (1972). Others have held that there must be culpable participation. E.g., Rorhez
11, 527 F.2d at 885; Hughes v.Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 194,133, at 94,551 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
84 N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1025-26.
s'See note 5 supra.
See note 4 supra.
87 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 695. See, e.g., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
89 536 F.2d at 694-95. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir.
1975). Congress specifically did not define control so as to enable section 20(a) to apply to a wide
range of relationships. See note 81 supra. Most commentators agree that Congress could not have
intended to limit remedies for securities violations. E.g., William & Mary Note. supra note 74,
at 718.
- 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit maintained that section 20(a) did not
preclude the application of common law principles. 9 ' Accordingly,
the court found a brokerage house liable under respondeat superior
92
for the "churning" of a customer's account by one of its employees.
The theory set forth in Holloway and Fey finds more explicit
support in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.,9' a Second Circuit
case. In Management Dynamics, the court of appeals affirmed an
injunction which was issued against a brokerage firm because of
misrepresentations made by the firm's vice-president in charge of
trading. 4 The court held that "[section] 20(a) was not intended as
the sole measure of employer liability." 95 It noted that the legislative
history of section 20(a) did not indicate that Congress intended to
supplant common law agency principles,96 and went on to state that
"given the pervasive applicability of agency principles elsewhere in
the law, it would take clear evidence to persuade us that Congress
intended to supplant such principles. ' 97 The court explicitly held
that the controlling person provision of section 20(a) did not preclude
application of common law agency principles.9 8 In fact, like the
Holloway court, it believed that the controlling person provision was
meant to expand, rather than limit liability. 9 The court buttressed
its holding by pointing out that "person" is defined in the Securities
Exchange Act as including corporations. 100 Therefore, the court reasoned that "Congress evidently intended that a corporation might be
liable in some instances as a 'person'; and this can only be by virtue of
agency principles, since a corporation can act only through its
agents."101 The Management Dynamics court, however, stressed the
narrowness of its holding. 102 The court simply decided that the firm
was liable because of the apparent authority of the vice-president and
his ability to mislead the public. 10 3 It stated: "[W]e intimate no view
as to other cases which may involve lesser employees, . . . other

"' Id.at 1052. Accord, Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
92

493 F.2d at 1052.

93515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
91 Id. at 813.
Ild. at 812.
Id. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
97 515 F.2d at 812.
2S Id.
oId.
'0 Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78c
1*1 515 F.2d at 812.

102Id. at 813.
103 Id.

(1976).
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agency principles, or respondeat superior, which may be broader than
10 4
the apparent authority involved here."
In Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 0 5 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit examined the question which was left open by
the Management Dynamics court. The Marbury Management court
held a brokerage firm liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the fraudulent misrepresentations of a broker trainee.10 By holding the corporation liable for the broker trainee's conduct, the court
indicated a willingness to extend secondary liability to a brokerage
firm for any 1Ob-5 violations. The court stated that when respondeat
superior is applied to impose liability, the good faith defense afforded
by section 20(a) is simply unavailable. 0 7 The court further stated
that there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to narrow the
remedies available for violations of the securities acts, or to create a
novel defense in cases governed by agency principles. 108 In support of
this view, the court pointed to section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which specifically states that "[t]he rights and remedies
provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other rights
09
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." 1
Given this line of case law which approves the use of agency
principles despite section 20(a), one might be tempted to view Sharp
as somewhat of an aberration because it viewed the application of
respondeat superior as the exception, and not the rule. This is not the
case, however, because the Sharp court merely relied upon Rochez II,
a prior Third Circuit opinion. The problem which arises is that Rochez II does not appear to be well reasoned. The Rochez II court
relied on what it perceived to be the legislative intent behind section
20(a) to reach its conclusion that section 20(a) precludes the application of agency principles." 0 The court reasoned that "to use respondeat superior for imposing secondary liability would not advance the
legislative purpose of the 1934 Act and in fact would also undermine
the Congressional intent by emasculating section 20(a).""' Having

Id.
629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 566 (1981).
100 Id. at 707.
104

os

10"Id. at 716.
108Id.

1- 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976). Reid v. Madison, 455 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (E.D. Va. 1978)
("remedies provided by the Federal Securities laws are in addition to, rather than in substitution
of, any other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity"). See Diamond v.
Oreamundo, 301 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
11
1

527 F.2d at 885.
Id. at 886.
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said this, the court went on to imply that respondeat superior could be
applied in cases involving broker-dealers."12 In effect, after stating
that Congress intended to preempt common law agency principles,
the court created a supposedly narrow exception. Assuming the court's
view as to legislative intent to be correct, this must be viewed as an
example of judicial legislation. The court used a public policy rationale to override Congressional intent. If Congress actually did intend to
preempt common law agency principles, a flat rule should be established prohibiting agency principles from applying in every situation.
Assuming, arguendo, that it is necessary to have an exception to
the general rule prohibiting application of agency principles, the
Sharp holding indicates that the exception has in fact engulfed the
more general rule. The Rochez II court specifically mentioned only
broker-dealer relationships when referring to situations in which
agency principles should apply."13 The Sharp court, however, did
not hesitate to expand the exception to include accounting firms. This
was a logical extension of the Rochez II exception. Because the Rochez
II exception will be applied to any relationship which involves a
"public trust," however, the result is that there are few situations in
which respondeat superior will not be applied. The possibility of not
applying the doctrine arises only in the context of the average corporation where no high fiduciary duties exist. When high-level employees
violate securities laws there is no need to resort to theories of secondary liability since these persons represent the corporation and the
corporation can be held primarily liable for their actions." 4 As a
result, only in cases of lower-level employees will the doctrine of
respondeat superior apply. Because most lOb-5 violations are not
committed by low-level employees, for all practical purposes agency
principles will always apply. Therefore, what the Rochez II and
Sharp courts put forth as an exception has in actuality become the
rule.
There are three ways in which a court could treat the issue of
section 20(a) exclusivity. If the court believes that Congress intended
to restrict the remedies available to plaintiffs in securities fraud cases,
the court could adopt a strict rule which would not allow application
of agency principles under any circumstances. Alternatively, the court
could adopt the Sharp approach and hold that agency principles are
inapplicable except in cases involving a "public trust." A court may
argue that an exception is warranted because Congress could not
112 Id.

Id.
I1
'"

649 F.2d at 182 n.8.
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possibly have intended to limit available remedies in such cases. Finally, the court may take the Marbury Management approach and
hold that section 20(a) and common law agency principles are not
mutually exclusive.
With respect to the first possibility, such an approach would
appear to be contrary to legislative intent. 1 5 Although it is not
exactly clear what Congress intended when it enacted section 20(a),
the vast majority of courts'" and commentators"17 believe that Congress intended to expand, rather than limit the availability of remedies for violations of the securities laws. This can be inferred from
section 28(a) which in essence provides that the remedies available at
common law are to be preserved under the act. It is difficult to
imagine a clearer indication of the intent behind the entire Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 than section 28(a). Congress intended to expand
available remedies so as to aid investors who were being defrauded." 8 It is also significant that no case could be found in which
a court adopted a flat rule prohibiting the application of common law
agency principles.
As stated above, the Sharp alternative also seems to be based
upon a misconception of legislative intent. The Sharp court adopted
I's See note 76 supra. Ultimately, the issue is whether or not Congress intended respondeat
superior not to apply. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv.. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). it
was argued that municipalities and other local governments should be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) on a respondeat superior theory. In rejecting this argument, the court first
examined the statute itself and determined that its language required a plaintiff to show
causation. The Court reasoned that if causation need be shown, respondeat superior could not
possibly apply. 436 U.S. at 692. Next, the Court examined the two policies behind the doctrine.
namely that application of respondeat superior would advance accidents, and that the cost of
such accidents should be borne by the community as a whole. Id. at 693-94. The Court noted
that these were the justifications put forth for the Sherman Amendment, which was believed to
be unconstitutional. Id. The Sherman Amendment to the bill, which was the precursor of section
1983, would have held a municipality liable "for damage done to the person or property of its
inhabitants by private persons 'riotously and tumultuously assembled." '" Id. at 664 (quoting
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871)).
In short, Congress believed application of respondeat superior in this context to be unconstitutional, and therefore clearly rejected the idea. Because there was a clear Congressional
directive, the Court held that it could not apply respondeat superior. Id. at 694. With respect to
section 20(a), there is no clear Congressional intent present.
"6 E.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d at 812; Marbury Management, Inc.
v. Kohn, 629 F.2d at 716.
...N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1041; William & Mary Note, supra note 74, at 718. -It is
more probable that the controlling person provisions were enacted to extend liability into those
agency situations where strict application of respondeat superior principles would preclude
liability." Id.
118 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon,
378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
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the first approach, and then proceeded to compound its error by
contravening the very intent which it attributed to Congress. The
court did not even attempt to explain how it was able to carve out an

exception to a rule which it claimed was mandated by Congress. In
effect, the court has adopted the approach of the Second Circuit.'",
The third approach conforms most with the legislative intent
behind section 20(a) and the purpose behind the securities laws.' 2 0 In
enacting section 20(a), Congress intended to expand the remedies
available for securities laws violations.' 2' Furthermore, it can be

argued that section 20(a) and the doctrine of respondeat superior are
not always in conflict. Courts such as Sharp believe there is a conflict
because the defenses available under section 20(a) are not available
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. It must be noted, however,
that when respondeat superior is applicable, the defenses in section
20(a) will often not apply. For a person to be held liable under

respondeat superior, he must be an employer. If he is an employer,
chances are that he will be found to be a controlling person under
section 20(a). With respect to the good faith defense, it can be argued
that if an employer has a duty to supervise,12 2 he could not have acted

in good faith. In short, it appears that in most cases there will be no
conflict because the defenses in section 20(a) will not preclude liability.

A problem which arises with respect to the application of respondeat superior, however, concerns the issue of scienter. The Supreme
Court has adopted a very strict standard of scienter in 10b-5 casesone which requires an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or at
a minimum, reckless conduct.' 23 If a person is held liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, it may be that he will be held liable
"ig See, e.g., Marbury Management.
12oSee note 76 supra.
,"I Several commentators have suggested that cases involving private implied causes of actions
for violations of the securities laws provide support for the view that respondeat superior and
section 20(a) are not mutually exclusive. E.g. William & Mary Note, supra note 74, at 723 &
n.59; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 70, at 1034. Courts have held that limitations found in explicit
statutory provisions should not be read into implied causes of action under rule 1Ob-5. E.g., Ellis
v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951). But see Cilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir. 1970) (limitations of section 1212
incorporated into 10b-5 cause of action); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Boyle, O'Connor & Co., 401
F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1968) (limitation incorporated into 10b-5 cause of action).
12 Several courts have equated lack of good faith with negligence. "Whether this alleged
failure to supervise vitiates the 'good faith' defense provided under § 20(a) ....
or whether it
constitutes sufficiently negligent conduct to render Lehman directly liable as a participant
according to the SEC, doubtless are two different ways of phrasing the same questions." SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Ernst & Ernst' v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
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for conduct which is only negligent. Such a result would contravene
the mandate of the Supreme Court. In view of this it is obvious that
the scienter required in rule 10b-5 cases should also be applied when
attempting to impose secondary liability. The Sharp court held that
the requirement of scienter in rule 10b-5 actions did not preclude the
imposition of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior even
where the employer's actions did not rise to the level of recklessness. 2 4 Because Cooper's & Lybrand had a duty of "careful supervision," the court did not believe that recklessness had to be shown.

25

It
2

was enough that the tax supervisor possessed the requisite scienter. 0
It is difficult to comprehend why a duty to supervise should have any
bearing on whether or not the scienter required in 10b-5 actions has
been met. Indeed, a corporation should not be held to a stricter
standard of liability in cases where it acts through an agent, as opposed to cases involving primary conduct.
Courts must adopt an approach to respondeat superior and section 20(a) which reflects an understanding of the legislative purpose
behind section 20(a), as well as the need to protect the investing
public. The Sharp rationale clearly does not reflect an understanding
of either of these factors. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon
resolve the conflict which exists in the various circuit courts of appeals. Until then, application of respondeat superior in securities cases
will remain a muddled area of the law.
Patrick W. Foley
649 F.2d at 193.
125 Id. at 194.
In Id. at 193.
'='

